Much has been said about the time table that the Obama administration has used to determine if additional troops are needed in Afghanistan. While some may conclude that it is a show of indecision, the development of strategy in a complex situation is not only warranted, but required.

When the United States and her allies first landed in Afghanistan the mission was simple; find and destroy the terrorist organization known as Al-Qaida and render it incapable of launching a terrorist attack on the United States or its allies again. For the most part, that mission has been accomplished. Al-Qaeda is splintered and most of its leadership is dead or captured. Save for a few meager transmissions, Osama Bin Laden’s current main occupation is to not get killed. So with the primary target neutralized, where do we go from here?

The secondary target in our war against terrorism was the government that harbored Al-Qaida; the Taliban. The Taliban was sent into exile as we pursued the terrorists into the mountains where their few surviving members remain to this day. Now we need to determine if and when we can finally terminate military operations in the area, but first we must develop a new strategy based on current circumstances, not the ones that led us there in the first place.

Just what that strategy is and a timeline to carry it out is exactly what the Obama administration is working on. There are a number of questions that must be answered first.

Question 1: What is our commitment to the people of Afghanistan? If all allied forces left Afghanistan today, how long would it be before the Taliban gained control of the country again? My guess is that they would move quickly and violently. Perhaps there will be some resistance, but with the apparent corruption in the Afghanistan government, how long and how strong will that resistance be? The long term effects of this scenario would be a loss of credibility by the United States as a protector of the weak. That could open the door for China or even Iran to gain status in the region if they would move into Afghanistan and assume the role of protector. Such an event happened before when Viet Nam overthrew the Khmer Rouge in 1979. The aggressor became the protector.

Question 2: If leaving is not an option, then how long do we (or can we) stay? Recent estimates place the cost of sending additional troops to Afghanistan at as much as one million dollars each. Such costs would justify the president examining all options before adding to the cost of an already expensive war. There must be a set goal, known in the military as a mission statement, which provides direction to military operations. Examples of such a statement; “To deny the Taliban entrance into Afghanistan,” or perhaps “To destroy the Taliban’s ability to operate in the region.” That is if the Taliban is our new primary target.

Question 3: Why are we staying? Is the United States ready to commit to the people of Afghanistan for an extended period of time? The Taliban has proven surprisingly resilient and it seems unlikely that they are going away, so how long are we willing to guard the gates? Five years? Ten Years? Indefinitely? If our primary objective was to eliminate Al-Qaeda’s ability to attack us again, then the primary mission is accomplished. If we now say that we are there to keep the peace, then that is a new mission similar to our commitment to Europe after World War II. That commitment lasted 50 years.

Question 4: Is there another means to win the war outside of military action? If it will cost us one million dollars per each additional soldier sent to Afghanistan, is there a better way to win the peace? Some have scoffed at the idea of paying off tribal leaders, but if a few million dollars in bribe money saves a single American soldier’s life, isn’t it worth considering?

Winning a war is easier that bringing lasting peace to an unstable region. We may very well be in this for quite some time while we keep our thumb in the dike.